摘要
本文介绍了黄衍博士认为关联理论“不可证伪”,是一种“因错而‘对’”的理论。他指出,除非关联理论最终有可能找到证明它不能解释的反例,除非人们不靠直觉而靠其他手段就能估量理解的过程,关联理论才算站得住脚。本文同时介绍了Francisco Yus博士和Dan Sperber教授对黄衍言论所作的评述。Yus认为,关联理论根本就不是经验性的,至少不具备词典给“经验性的(empirical)”这个词所下的定义。关联理论是一个理论模式。它旨在解释人们理解话语的过程。Sperber针对黄认为关联理论“不可证伪”、不容存在反例的观点,说这这个批评是错误的。他认为正确的论证恰恰与此相反:允许例外情况存在的概括性理论是很难被驳倒的,因为任何反例都可以作为例外而不被看成是反例;另一方面,他申辩说,不容例外的概括性理论(如一些硬科学理论)一旦发现它们是错时.就很容易被证伪了。关联理论与所有概括性科学理论一样,它并不会为迎合某些数据而没完没了地去重新解释自己。本文在回顾Popper证伪论的基础上,较全面地阐述了该理论与关联理论之间的关系,旨在通报有关关联理论的一些争鸣,以便扩大国内语言学界对关联理论发展动向的认识和了解,吸引更多的学者关注关联理论的发展。
This paper introduces the criticism by Huang Yan on the 'non-falsifiability' of Relevance Theory (RT), which, according to him, is a case of being 'right' for the wrong reason. Also, a summary is given of the feedbacks on the issue from Francisco Yus and Dan Sperber. Huang holds that there is a serious problem at the very heart of RT - the problem of non-falsifiability. Given that Relevance is an exceptionless generalization, it is immune from any possible counterexample. Consequently, in the absence of empirical evidence, it is difficult to evaluate, much less to falsify the central claims of RT. If Relevance cannot be falsified, then the whole framework will not satisfy the minimal Popperian criterion for a scientific theory, which dictates that empirically based theories (under which linguistics falls) can only be refuted, but not be confirmed (Popper 1973). One can therefore conclude that unless and until RT can be rendered false, and means other than intuition can be devised to measure processing, its theoretical claims stand largely upon terra non firma.
However, Yus and Sperber have their comments on Huang's criticisms. According to Yus, RT does not satisfy the Popperian criterion for a scientific theory just because it is not empirical, at least not in the sense that we can find in dictionaries. Rather, RT is a theoretical model which aims at explaining interpretive procedures which are highly mysterious in the first place. Sperber points out that Huang' s criticisms are plainly wrong. In particular, the argument regarding Relevance being immune from any possible counterexample is quite mistaken. Generalizations that take account of exceptions are very difficult if not impossible to refute because any counterexample can be dismissed as an exception. On the other hand an exceptionless generalization (as is the case with the harder sciences) is much easier to falsify if it happens to be false. In order to falsify the principle of relevance, it would suffice to find cases of genuine communicative acts that do not convey a presumption of their own optimal relevance, but that convey, for instance, a presumption of maximal informativeness, or no presumption of any sort about themselves at all. Such communicative acts would be interpreted in a manner quite different from that described by RT.
This paper discusses the essence of Popper's theory of falsifiability and the relationship between RT and Popper's understanding of a scientific theory. The aim of this discussion is to broaden the understanding of the RT development in China's linguistic circle and make more scholars interested in the RT issues.
出处
《现代外语》
CSSCI
北大核心
2004年第1期89-96,共8页
Modern Foreign Languages
