摘要
销售系统中存在着典型的信息不对称情况:委托人(公司)对代理人(销售人员)的努力程度具有不对称信息,委托人不能观测到代理人努力程度,因而常根据销售业绩来制定薪酬激励机制。本文研究销售系统中具有多个代理人且代理人之间存在竞争关系的委托代理问题。在假设市场最终需求对努力水平敏感,且某代理人努力水平提高时,他可以在开拓市场的同时,吸引对方顾客的条件下,建立了具有多代理人且代理人间存在竞争的委托代理模型。得到当努力成本、风险规避度、产出不确定性越大,代理人的风险分担越小,利润提成越低,越倾向于取得固定工资;竞争程度越高,代理人的努力程度也随之提高;利用代理人之间的竞争可以使委托人获利等结论。
The typical asymmetric information always exists in selling system. As the principal （company） has asymmetric information with the agents＇ （seller） effort level, the pay scheme is often designed according to sales volume. The paper studies the principal-agent problem with multiple agents. On the basis of assumption the market demand is sensitive to effort level and the two sellers have competition, the pay scheme designing method is proposed with Multi-Agent Competition. The results show with the competition increasing the agents have to improve their efforts, and they prefer to lower risk share and fixed wages while more uncertainty of market and costs of effort, and the principal may be benefited by making use of the agents＇ competition.
出处
《管理工程学报》
CSSCI
2007年第4期153-156,共4页
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70472032)
南京理工大学经济管理学院青年基金资助项目
关键词
销售系统
薪酬制度设计
委托代理理论
多代理人
信息不对称
production distribution system
incentive contracts
principal-agent theory
multiple agents
asymmetric information
