摘要
分析了具有两个制造商和一个零售商组成的分销系统中的委托代理问题。在该系统中,两制造商作为委托人,零售商作为代理人。在假设两制造商的产品对于服务水平敏感且产品间存在部分替代性的基础上,制造商通过对零售商实施奖金激励来实现其利益最大化的目的。分别考虑制造商非合作竞争和合作行为这两种情况,建立了相应的委托代理模型。仿真结果表明,制造商在非合作竞争中受损,而零售商得到了"渔翁之利";特别是在制造商的商品间替代性逐渐增强时,这种受损更为严重,而零售商得利更多。同时,仿真结果表明,合作对制造商有利,而对零售商不利。
The principal-agent theory in distribution system was studied in the paper. The system has two manufacturers as principals and one retailer as agent. On the basis of the assumption that the demand of the manufacturer's product is sensitive to service level, and the products have partial substitution, the problem that how the manufacturers incentive the retailer to maximize their profits was discussed. Two situations including non-cooperation and cooperation between manufacturers were considered, and the related principal-agent models were given. The simulation results show the two manufacturers' profits are damaged in non-cooperation situation, however the retailer is benefited from the situation. Especially the damage to manufacturers is higher with the substitution of their products increasing, and the retailer is benefited more in the situation. Meanwhile the simulation results indicate the manufacturers would be benefited as they adopt the cooperation action, but the retailer's profit is damaged.
出处
《系统工程理论方法应用》
2004年第4期361-366,共6页
Systems Engineering Theory·Methodology·Applications
基金
国家科技部资助项目(2003EE550001)
辽宁省科技厅软科学资助项目(2002401107)
关键词
分销系统
供应链
合作
激励机制
进化博弈论
distribution system
supply chain
cooperation
incentive mechanism
evolutionary game (theory)
