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基于过度自信的多代理人委托代理模型研究 被引量:2

The Study of Principal-agent Model with Multiple Agents Based on Overconfidence
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摘要 将过度自信融入具有竞争关系的多代理人委托代理模型,分析了过度自信对代理人和委托人的影响。研究表明:非对称信息时,代理人对能力水平和所掌握信息准确性的过度自信水平与自身的努力水平和其竞争对手的努力水平均成正相关;代理人对能力水平的过度自信水平与由于信息不对称造成的自身努力程度的下降幅度及代理成本呈正相关,代理人对所掌握信息准确性的过度自信水平则与之呈负相关。这对企业招聘具有一定的指导意义。 This paper introduces overconfidence to establish principal-agent model with multiple agents existing competitive relation under symmet- ric and asymmetric information situations, And analyzing the influence of overconfidence to agents and principal. The results show that:under asym- metric information situation,the agent's overconfidence to the level of ability and the accuracy of information is positively correlated to his own ef- fort level and his eompetitor'a effort level; the agent's overconfidence to the level of ability is postively correlated to the decline rate of his effort level caused by asymmestrie information and the cost of agent~ the agent's overconfidence to the accuracy of information is negatively correlated to the decline rate of his effort level caused by asymmestric information and the cost of agent. Which can provide some good advice to enterprises's re- cruitment.
出处 《科技和产业》 2013年第1期107-111,共5页 Science Technology and Industry
基金 福建省社科规划项目(2009B088)
关键词 过度自信 竞争关系 多代理人 委托代理模型 overconfidence competitive relation multiple agents principal-agent model
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