摘要
当双边委托-代理关系中的委托人从一个增加到数个时,委托人之间便产生了合作与竞争的问题,此环境下的激励机制设计与传统委托-代理关系相比就要复杂得多。自Bernheim和Whinston(1985,1986)提出多委托人(亦称共同代理)框架以来,Martimort(1996～2004)的一系列论文进一步发展了多委托人激励理论。本文系统梳理了该领域的主要研究路径:一是共同代理博弈均衡的特征;二是多委托人环境下的激励机制设计原理;三是委托人的竞争与合作对激励提供的影响;四是代理人面临多任务情况时的激励问题。最后论文总结了多委托人激励理论的多方面应用并探讨了其未来的发展方向。
When the number of principal increases from one to two or more in bilateral principal-agent relationship, the corporation and competition among principals arises, and the design of incentive mechanisms is more complicated than traditional principal-agent theory. Bernheim and Whinston ( 1985 ,1986) proposed the original framework for multiprincipals ( common agency) , and Martimort( 1991 -2004) has developed the multiprincipals incentive theory. The paper characterizes the researches in this field into four paths. First, on the characteristics of equilibrium in common agency games; Second, on the principles of incentive mechanism design; Third, from the principal point of view, how the competition and cooperation among principals affect incentive offer; Fourth, from the agent point of view, on the problem of the agent's multitask. Finally, we summarize the applications of multiprincipals incentive theory and discuss its future development.
出处
《产业经济研究》
2005年第3期54-63,共10页
Industrial Economics Research
