摘要
阐述企业激励机制的基本内涵 ,研究探讨了基于代理人的货币需求、闲暇需求和努力程度等因素的最优契约设计 。
This paper studies the optimal contracts design based on the agent's requisition for monetary and rest, and the degree of the agent's work. The agency costs and the discriepancy of the contracts between incomplete information and asymmetric information are discussed in this article.
出处
《系统工程理论与实践》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2000年第6期50-53,共4页
Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice
关键词
委托-代理
激励机制
成本分析
工资
企业
principal-agency
incentive mechanism
cost analysis
asymmetric information
contract
