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高考招生制度改革的路径:竞争和配额的折衷 被引量:15

The Roads for College Admission System Reform:Trade-off between Competing and Quota
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摘要 高考招生现行的"配额制"造成了考生与大学之间"高分低就"和"低分高就"的不稳定匹配。"竞争制"导向的改革可以达到高招结果的稳定性,但却会大规模伤害现行制度下的既得利益,引发反对浪潮。因此可取的高招制度应是介于配额制和竞争制之间的一种折衷。"人口比例配额制"、"出资比例配额制"、"次级配额制"和"异地高考配额制"是四种典型的折衷制度。基于北京和山东数据的数值模拟表明,从偏离稳定匹配程度(偏离率)和既得利益受损引发反对强度(受损率)两方面来看,"次级配额制"是六种制度中最可取的。另外,当前呼声很高的开放异地高考的诉求,并不是高招制度改革最可取的方案,因为其偏离率和受损率都比竞争制大。 The existing quota system of College Entrance Examination creates the candidate-university match where some candidates with good scores accepted to some poor university while some candidates with poor scores accepted to some good university. Competition system oriented reforms can achieve stability of the college admission results, but will hurt massively vested interests under the current system, triggering the wave of protests. Therefore desirable college admission system should be a compromise between quota system and competition system. Population proportion quota, funded proportion quota, subprime quota, and Offsite College Entrance Examination quota are four typical compromise systems. The numerical simulations based on the data from Beijing and Shandong show that subprime quota system is the most desirable among all six systems mentioned above, in terms of both deviation degree from the stable matching ( deviation rate) and intensity of protests caused by damaged vested interests (damage rate). In addition, the current strong appeal to Offsite College Entrance Examination is not the most desirable option because of both its deviation rate and its damage rate larger than competition system.
出处 《经济研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2014年第2期155-170,共16页 Economic Research Journal
基金 国家社科基金重大项目(12&ZD074) 复旦大学985工程三期整体推进社会科学研究项目(2011SHKXZD003) 中国博士后科学基金面上资助项目(2012M511013)资助
关键词 匹配 稳定 配额 竞争 异地高考 Match Stability Quota Competition Offsite College Entrance Examination
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