摘要
本文分析了高考志愿填报三种不同机制(即考前报、估分报和知分报)下，考生之间策略决策的纳什均衡结果，以此来评估三种制度在人才筛选方面的效率。我们发现，三种填报机制之间不存在帕累托改进。但在许多情况下，考前报和估分报可能达成社会应有效率，其中又以考前报可能性更大，此外更大范围内的竞争也有利于消除投机激励。关键均参数包括考生正常发挥的概率和对不同学校评价的差异度。
This paper discusses the three application mechanisms of college entrance exam,i.e .applying before exam,after exam yet before score announcement ,and after score announcement . We give the Nash Equilibrium outcomes and evaluate the comparative efficiency of the three schemes . We find that there does not exist Paretoi mprovement among all three .But in many cases the first two can achieve social efficiency . Competition helps to eli minate the incentive to arbitrate . The paper sheds lights on the screening problems of si milar social issues .
出处
《经济学（季刊）》
2004年第3期763-778,共16页
China Economic Quarterly
