摘要
本文通过在代建服务取费基本模型中引入政府投资人与代建人之间的风险分担因素,对模型中激励费用部分的激励费率和相应的取费基数进行了分析,并就不同风险分担组合条件下的代建服务取费模型进行了描述。研究结果表明,代建服务取费模型中的激励费率和相应的取费基数都与风险分担有着直接或间接的关系,而风险分担取决于双方的风险态度,从客观上要求政府委托人对代建人的风险态度做出准确的判断。该结论将为构建合理的代建服务取费机制提供参考依据。
The implementation of Agent Construction System(ACS) is aiming at resolving the problems arising from traditional management mode.However,ACS has encountered some problems,and the agent construction service pricing mechanism is one of the most important problems.By introducing risk allocation of the government principal and the construction agency into the primary pricing model,the article analysis the incentive ratio and relative benchmark in the model.Moreover,it has described the agent construction service pricing model under the conditions of different risk allocation arrangements.It has showed that the incentive ratio and the relative benchmark in the pricing model are both influenced by the risk allocation directly or indirectly.And the risk allocation arrangement is determined by risk preferences of the principal and the agency.It required the principal to make accurate judgment on the agency's risk preference.It would provide valuable advices and references for establishing a suitable agent construction service pricing mechanism.
出处
《财经问题研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第3期86-91,共6页
Research On Financial and Economic Issues
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(70872084)
关键词
政府投资项目
代建服务取费机制
风险分担
项目剩余
government investment projects
agent construction service pricing mechanism
risk allocation
project residual
