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上市公司股权制衡指数研究 被引量:1

Research on the Resistant Power in Shareholdres Index of the Listed Company
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摘要 通过研究沪深两市股权分置改革后的A股上市公司的股权结构,运用实证的方法验证了股权制衡与公司业绩的关系。以熵理论为基础,构建了一个科学衡量股权制衡的指数——熵值公式。意在更全面地度量上市公司的股权制衡状况.实证研究表明,股权制衡对竞争性公司的业绩确有促进作用。此外还发现。公司规模与公司业绩没有相关性。负债率与公司业绩呈负相关,机构投资者可明显改善公司业绩。 The relationship between the resistant power in shareholders and the performances of the listed companies is researched based on empirical study, by means of the analysis of the shareholder structure of the listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market A, which has reformed the liquidity of the share structure. We create a scientific formula-- entropy formula, which can measure the degree of the power balance in share structure comprehensively. Results show that equity balance can promote the performances of the competitive companies. Results also reveal that company size has no correlation to company performance, debt rate has negative correlation to company performance, and institutional investors can improve performances of the listed companies.
出处 《北京工业大学学报(社会科学版)》 CSSCI 2008年第4期28-32,共5页 Journal of Beijing University of Technology (Social Sciences Edition)
关键词 股权制衡 公司业绩 熵理论 resistant power in shareholders company performance entropy theory
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参考文献5

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二级参考文献8

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