摘要
鉴于公司的财务行为受到公司治理因素的影响,本文从公司治理的角度,基于国内外的相关研究提出六个研究假设,然后构建回归模型,依据1999年—2003年中国上市公司数据进行假设检验,具体探讨前五大股东持股比例以及在此基础上大股东之间的监督制衡机制对于上市公司派发现金股利的影响,研究因为我国股市“同股同权不同价”的特殊现象而导致的现金股利的“隧道效应”,探索其中的影响机制和制衡机制。研究显示,前五大股东的持股比例、大股东控制力(或联合控制力)、大股东制衡度(或联合制衡度)对派发现金股利的“隧道效应”存在重要影响。本文最后给出五点建议,试图限制控股股东通过现金股利的“隧道效应”谋取私利,以保护中小股东的正当权益。
Due to the important influence of corporate governance on corporate financial behaviors and from an angle of corporate governance, we develop six hypotheses based on overseas and home relevant researches and data of Chinese listed companies from 1999 to 2003, and do hypotheses testes with regression models to examine the impact of share percent of top 5 shareholders and supervision and balance mechanism among bloekholders on cash dividend distribution of listed companies, and to explore influence and balance mechanisms in tunneling of cash dividend which derived from the special phenomena of ＂same shares same fights but different price＂. We find that share percent of top 5 shareholders, control ability （or combined control ability） and balance degree （ or combined balance degree） of bloekholders have important influence on tunneling of cash dividend distribution. Lastly, the paper proposes five suggestions to restrict controlling shareholders to enlist self-interests from tunneling of cash dividend and to protect rights and interests of small and medium shareholders.
出处
《南开经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第1期60-78,共19页
Nankai Economic Studies
基金
本文受国家自然科学基金项目(70272026)教育部人文社科重点研究基地重大项目(04JJD630004)教育部哲学社会科学重大攻关项目(03JZD0018)等资助
关键词
大股东制衡
现金股利
隧道效应
公司治理
Blockhoder Balance
Cash Dividend
Tunneling
Corporate Governance
