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股份流动性、股权制衡机制与现金股利的隧道效应——来自1999—2003年中国上市公司的证据 被引量:63

Share Liquidity,Balance Mechanism of Shareholders and Tunneling of Cash Dividend:Evidences from Chinese Listed Companies from 1999 to 2003
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摘要 本文基于国内外的相关研究,从公司治理的角度提出六个研究假设,然后构建回归模型研究因为我国股市“同股同权不同价”的股权分置现象而导致的现金股利的“隧道效应,”具体探讨非流通股和流通股流动性、股权监督制衡机制对于上市公司派发现金股利的影响。实证结果显示,非流通股股东(通常为控股股东)和流通股股东(通常为中小股东)之间的确存在严重的利益冲突。各类非流通股和流通股股东的持股比例、所持股份类型以及他们之间的监督制衡作用对派发现金股利的“隧道效应”存在重要影响。本文最后给出六点建议试图限制非流通股股东通过现金股利的“隧道效应”谋取私利。 In this paper,from an angle of corporate governance,we develop six hypotheses based on overseas and home relevant researches,and do hypotheses testes with regression models to examine the tunneling of cash dividend which derived from the share separation phenomena of "same shares same rights but different price" and to discuss the impact of liquidity of un-tradable shares and tradable shares,supervision and balance mechanism among shareholders on cash dividend distribution of listed companies. We find that serious interests conflict exists between un-tradable shares and tradable shares,and proportion and types of un-tradable shares (usually held by controlling shareholders) and tradable shares (usually held by small and medium shareholders) ,and supervision and balance mechanism of shareholders have important influence on tunneling of cash dividend distribution. Lastly,the paper proposes six suggestions to restrict controlling shareholders who hold un-tradable shares to enlist self-interests from tunneling of cash dividend.
出处 《中国工业经济》 CSSCI 北大核心 2006年第2期120-128,共9页 China Industrial Economics
基金 教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目"中国公司治理评价指数研究"(批准号04JJD630003) 国家自然科学基金项目"网络治理的机制 结构与应用研究"(批准号70272026) 教育部哲学社会科学重大攻关项目"中国民营经济制度创新与发展问题研究"(批准号03JZD0018)
关键词 股份流动性 制衡机制 现金股利 隧道效应 公司治理 share liquidity balance mechanism cash dividend tunneling corporate governance
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参考文献16

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