摘要
风险投资中的控制权分配直接影响企业的价值以及风险资本家与风险企业家的个人利益。本文通过简单的模型分析了风险投资合同中控制权的分配和转移,认为控制权尤其是剩余控制权是一种“状态依存权”,并且剩余控制权和剩余索取权是可分离的,且不必完全对应。这些结论基本符合融资控制理论的预测并得到实证支持。
The allocation of control rights in venture capital affects the firm's value and benefit of venture capitalists and entrepreneur.This paper analyzes how the control rights be allocated and transferred.We argue that the control rights should be a state- contingent control right,and the residual claim rights and residual control rights are independent and incompletely corresponding.The conclusions are consistent with the existing control theory and empirical evidences.
出处
《安徽农业大学学报（社会科学版）》
2004年第3期26-28,60,共4页
Journal of Anhui Agricultural University:SOC.SCI.
