摘要
产权制度安排对创业资本的运作效率产生重要影响。创业资本产权的合理配置应该是赋予创业资本组织相对独立而充分的产权,构建激励与约束相容的创业资本组织形式,并在创业投资家和创业资本出资者之间分享剩余索取权。同时将控制权在创业投资企业管理人与创业企业家之间设计成随"状态"而变化的一种流动性权利。美、日之间在这些方面有很大的区别。日本创业资本运行的相对低效率与创业资本产权配置有直接关系。
The institutional arrangement of property rights has decisive impacts on the efficiency of venture capital. A well arranged structure should be featured with the full and relatively independent property rights of the venture firm, to ensure incentive compatibility and to distribute residual claims between the venture capitalists and the investors. The controlling rights of venture businesses, however, should be state - contingent and transferable between the ventrue capitalists and the entrepreneurs. Significant differences can be found when comparing the U.S. and Japan, I argue that the poor perfomance of Japanese venture capital is directly related to its problematic arrangement of property rights.
出处
《现代日本经济》
CSSCI
2008年第5期52-58,共7页
Contemporary Economy OF Japan
基金
国家社科基金项目"风险资本产权缺失与制度创新问题研究"(04CJL018)
浙江省软科学基金"提高浙江省中小民营企业国际化能力途径与政策研究"(2007C25024)
关键词
创业资本
产权配置
绩效
有限合伙制
激励相容
增值服务
Venture Capital
Property Rights Arrangement
Performance
Limited Partnership
Incentive Compatibility
Value - adding Service
