期刊文献+

风险投资中控制权、私人利益、声誉以及现金流权利的研究 被引量:4

On Control Right,Private benefits,Reputation and Cash Flow Rights in Venture Capital
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摘要 传统理论认为企业控制权和现金流权利具有对称性,即拥有更多的企业控制权就拥有更多的现金流权利,然而在风险投资领域二者之间具有不对称性。目前,国内外这方面的研究尚处于起步阶段,而本文通过建立模型对于均衡状态下影响风险企业控制权各种因素进行了系统研究。结论认为环境不确定性、创业者私人利益、创业者声誉和项目成功概率,以及和风险企业现金流权利各种因素对风险企业的控制权都会造成影响。 Traditional theory found that there is symmetry between the control rights and the cash flow rights, but there is un-symmetry in venture capital. With the model help, .some systemic research on the equilibrium relation about control rights, uncertainty, entrepreneur's private benefits or reputation, success probability, and cash flow rights of the enterprise has been given in this paper.
出处 《系统工程》 CSCD 北大核心 2006年第1期87-90,共4页 Systems Engineering
关键词 风险投资 控制权 私人利益 声誉 现金流权利 Venture Capital Control Rights Private Benefits Reputation Cash Flow Rights
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参考文献15

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二级参考文献39

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