摘要
本文从公共选择理论和新制度经济学视角出发,以公共权力自利性膨胀倾向与公共福利保障之间的悖论为核心,指出了公共权力的双重属性对公共福利产生三种作用:促进、阻碍以及促进和阻碍的混合状态;探析了社会个体福利诉求何以整合为公共福利,并指出公共福利诉求不能仅仅为社会强势集团所垄断,应从社会整体繁荣中普遍关注社会弱势群体福利;作为公共权力机构的政府应在平衡社会强势群体与弱势群体福利诉求的基础上,最大限度地保障社会弱势群体的基本福利。
Discussing from the views of public choice theories and new institutional economics, with a paradox between the bulgy self-benefited inclination of public welfare guarantee as a core, this article points out the three functional directions which the public power's dualism brings to the public welfare, that is, promotion, blockage and a commix of the two. It probes how social individual welfare appeals combine into the public welfare. The article also points out that the public welfare's appeal should not be monopolized only by the social advantaged group, the welfare of disadvantaged group should get the all-pervading care from the boom of the whole society; the government, as the institution of public power, should care and guarantee the basic welfare of the social disadvantaged group on the basis of a balance between social advantaged group and the welfare appeal of social disadvantaged group.
出处
《学术月刊》
CSSCI
北大核心
2003年第10期22-30,共9页
Academic Monthly
关键词
公共权力
公共福利保障
社会弱势群体
政府职能
the public power, the public welfare, the social disadvantaged, welfare guarantee
