摘要
高标准农田建设事关国家粮食安全,政府和企业是高质量推进高标准农田建设的重要主体。该研究基于演化博弈和复杂网络理论,分别建立“政府-企业”的两方博弈模型和企业的群体博弈模型,分析博弈模型的演化稳定性和网络拓扑特征。以湖北省武汉、襄阳、仙桃三市的高标准农田建设项目为例,揭示博弈主体的策略选择和连接偏好,探讨关键因素对政企合作博弈和企业群体博弈结果的影响。研究表明:1)考核奖励、激励政策、监管惩罚对政企的良性合作有积极作用,影响效果显现依次递减特征;不同强度条件下,考核奖励和激励政策对政企双方均有影响,监管惩罚主要对企业产生影响。2)当奖励和激励水平维持在附加成本50%时,能取得积极的政企合作效果;当达到4倍附加成本时,政企合作策略将发生逆转。3)企业对成本的变化反应强烈,附加成本和监管惩罚过高会抑制企业的积极性,在群体博弈中尤其明显,参与积极性会通过龙头企业的示范效应在网络中全面扩散。基于研究结果提出优化路径:一是实施精准激励和奖励,既能提振企业意愿,又可将政策成本控制在合理范围。二是构建“红黄牌”分级监管体系,提升企业群体的整体合规水平。以此助力政企积极合作,共同推动高标准农田建设的高质量发展。
High-standard farmland construction is closely related to national food security in recent years.The government and enterprises are important entities to promote the high-quality development of high-standard farmland construction.In this study,the game models were established for the“government-enterprise”and enterprise groups,according to the evolutionary game and complex network theory.A systematic analysis was made on the evolutionary stability and network topologies of the game models.A case study was taken as the high-standard farmland construction in Wuhan,Xiangyang,and Xiantao cities of Hubei Province.There were the strategy choices and connection preferences of the game players.An investigation was finally implemented to explore the key influence factors on the government-enterprise cooperation and the enterprise group game.The results showed that:1)Assessment rewards,incentive policies,and regulatory penalties all shared the positive effects on the sound government-enterprise cooperation.The magnitude of their influence exhibited a sequentially decreasing trend:the assessment rewards shared the strongest impact,followed by incentive policies,with the least direct influence of regulatory penalties on the cooperation levels.Furthermore,the assessment rewards and incentive policies were significantly dependent on the strategic choices of both government and enterprises under varying intensities.In contrast,the regulatory penalties primarily impacted the enterprise behavior,thus acting as a stronger deterrent or compliance driver for enterprises.2)The reward and incentive levels were maintained at approximately 50%the additional costs incurred by enterprises for the high-standard compliance.The most positive performances were achieved in engaging the cooperative government-enterprise.This level was sufficiently motivated the enterprises without the excessive fiscal burdens.Conversely,when the reward and incentive levels were reached 4 times the additional costs,there was a significant shift in the government strategy.The fiscal burden or perceived inefficiency often led to a reduction in its support or intensified regulatory measures instead of the high incentives.3)Enterprises demonstrated that there was a high sensitivity to cost variations.Excessive additional compliance costs and disproportionately high regulatory penalties significantly reduced the enterprise participation.This inhibitory effect was particularly pronounced within the enterprise population game model.Crucially,the participation was propagated extensively across the enterprise network,particularly for the leading enterprises or“industry champions”.These key players encouraged the wider adoption,while their reluctance triggered the widespread hesitancy within the network.The following optimization paths were proposed based on the research results:Firstly,a targeted approach was adopted to implement the different incentives and rewards.Specific enterprise types,project scales,regional features,and actual compliance costs were calibrated for the decision-making.Enterprise willingness can be expected to participate simultaneously for the overall policy implementation costs within a fiscally sustainable and reasonable range.The high-intensity incentives can also be avoided to trigger the strategy shifts.Secondly,a precise regulatory framework can be established to enhance the overall compliance level of the enterprise group,according to the“red and yellow card”classification.As such,these pathways can significantly improve the government-enterprise cooperation,thereby accelerating the high-quality development of high-standard farmland construction in China.
作者
魏威
彭雅贤
代立
黄家豪
WEI Wei;PENG Yaxian;DAI Li;HUANG Jiahao(School of Public Administration,Huazhong Agricultural University,Wuhan 430070)
出处
《农业工程学报》
北大核心
2025年第21期269-277,共9页
Transactions of the Chinese Society of Agricultural Engineering
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(72304107)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项(2662022GGQD002)
湖北本科高校省级教学改革研究项目(2024176)。
关键词
高标准农田建设
政府和企业
演化博弈
复杂网络
仿真分析
high-standard farmland construction
government and enterprise
evolutionary game
complex network
simulation analysis
