摘要
黄河下游滩区的土地利用优化对区域生态环境保护与农业可持续发展具有重要意义。为探究滩区土地利用的多主体互动及稳定机制,基于演化博弈理论,构建由河务管理机构、营利性组织和居民组成的三方演化博弈模型,分析主体间土地利用策略的演化稳定性,并采用数值仿真方法识别影响主体策略选择的关键因素。研究发现:加大治污处罚力度能够有效推动河务管理机构实施严格监管,促使营利性组织倾向于合作;提高各方主体合作时的社会福利和经济收益,或提升不合作的成本,能够显著提高博弈策略的稳定性。为此,建议管理机构合理提高污染罚款标准,完善相应补偿机制,并适当提高营利性组织和居民合作的收益水平,以增强激励与惩罚措施的综合效能,从而促进滩区土地利用与生态保护协调发展。
The lower Yellow River floodplain plays a vital role in flood control,ecological protection,and regional socioeconomic development.However,frequent floods combined with intensive land-use activities have caused serious ecological damage and land-use imbalances.Traditional governance methods,often limited to singlestakeholder regulation or strict administrative orders,have struggled to effectively resolve conflicts among multiple stakeholders:river management authorities responsible for ecological safety,profit-driven organizations focused on economic gains,and local residents directly affected by environmental quality.The flaws of traditional governance are clear from ongoing ecological decline and persistent stakeholder disputes,emphasizing the need for innovative governance approaches that can coordinate multiple parties and establish stable,sustainable land-use strategies.This study uses evolutionary game theory to analyze the dynamic interactions and strategic stability among three main stakeholders:river management authorities,profit-driven organizations,and local residents in the lower Yellow River floodplain.A mixed-strategy evolutionary game model was built,where river management authorities choose between strict or lenient regulations,profit organizations choose between cooperative or non-cooperative land uses,and residents choose between cooperation or non-cooperation in environmental protection.Numerical simulations,based on realistic payoff parameters and incentive structures,were conducted to identify key factors influencing stakeholder decisions and strategy stability.Equilibrium stability conditions were determined using Lyapunov stability criteria and Jacobian matrix analysis.Evolutionary game theory was chosen because of its effectiveness in modeling adaptive behaviors and long-term strategic evolution among stakeholders within complex ecological-economical systems.The analysis revealed that the strategic stability of river management authorities strongly hinges upon the severity of environmental penalties,regulatory costs,and perceived social welfare gains.Specifically,enhancing penalties for environmental violations markedly strengthens the inclination of river management authorities towards stringent regulatory measures,consequently promoting cooperative behavior among profit-oriented organizations.The willingness of these organizations to adopt cooperative strategies critically depends on balancing policy subsidies,economic returns from cooperative practices,and the costs associated with non-cooperation.Numerical simulations showed that increasing penalties for environmental violations(F1 from 4 to 10),subsidies for cooperative behaviors(S1 from 1.5 to 3.5),and returns from cooperative actions(R1 from 10 to 20)systematically shifted the system from suboptimal equilibria towards stable cooperative scenarios.For residents,indirect environmental and economic incentives significantly influence their cooperation.Positive feedback loops were identified,where increased cooperation within one stakeholder group enhances cooperative behaviors across others,reinforcing overall system stability and cooperation.To effectively promote sustainable land-use governance and ecological protection in the lower Yellow River floodplain,policymakers should actively strengthen environmental penalties,carefully design subsidy programs,and significantly increase economic incentives for cooperation.Improving transparency and fairness in regulation is essential to build stakeholder trust,ensure compliance,and enhance policy effectiveness.The numerical results of this study highlight that strategic adjustments to penalties,subsidies,and incentives can shift system equilibria from suboptimal to optimal cooperative states.Importantly,these findings offer practical policy guidance not only for managing ecological risks and land-use conflicts in the lower Yellow River floodplain but also serve as a valuable reference model for similar multi-party ecological governance challenges worldwide.
作者
李红艳
姜霄
陈华君
刘超
刘垒炟
陈玉辉
LI Hongyan;JIANG Xiao;CHEN Huajun;LIU Chao;LIU Leida;CHEN Yuhui(Research Center for South-To-North Water Diversion and The Ecological Environment of the Yellow River Basin,Henan University of Engineering,Zhengzhou 451191,China;Management Engineering School,Henan University of Engineering,Zhengzhou 451191,China)
出处
《南水北调与水利科技(中英文)》
北大核心
2025年第5期1249-1256,1268,共9页
South-to-North Water Transfers and Water Science & Technology
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(42377490,42077449)
河南省自然科学基金项目(222300420422)
河南省高校人文社会科学研究一般项目(2023-ZZJH-045)
河南省教育厅高等学校重点科研项目(22A630012)
河南省高校科技创新人才支持计划项目(人文社科类)(2021-CX-050)。
关键词
黄河下游滩区
土地利用
演化博弈
策略稳定性
数值仿真
lower Yellow River floodplain
land use
evolutionary game
strategy stability
numerical simulation
