摘要
当前主流电商平台主要提供两种销售模式:平台转销模式和平台代销模式.企业可选择其中一种,也可二者兼取.本研究从产品制造企业视角出发,探究企业在三种销售模式下的质量披露策略--平台转销模式、平台代销模式以及混合模式.研究发现:每种模式下,只有当产品质量高于某一阈值时企业才会自愿披露质量信息,同时当企业内生决策产品质量时上述结论依然成立;高参与型消费者比例增加或搜索成本的提高都会削弱企业披露质量信息的动机.与既往研究不同,当消费者在混合模式下的质量感知差异足够高时,企业在混合模式下即竞争环境中更可能披露产品质量.此外,通过比较三种模式下的企业收益发现,当平台佣金费率极高时,企业仅采用转销模式可以获得更高收益,其他情况下企业采用混合模式能得到更高收益.
Current mainstream e-commerce platforms usually provide two selling schemes:The reselling scheme and the agency scheme.Firms that sell products on these platforms can choose either or both.This pa-per examines the firm's quality disclosure strategies under three selling schemes:The reselling scheme,the a-gency scheme,and the mixed scheme.The analysis shows that a quality threshold exists under each scheme and that the firm chooses to disclose its quality only when the quality is above the threshold.The above result qualitatively holds when the firm endogenously decides the product quality.Moreover,the firm is less likely to disclose its quality when the proportion of high involved consumers or the search cost increases.Interestingly,unlike previous studies,when the consumer's perception of quality difference in the mixed scheme is suffi-ciently high,the firm is more likely to disclose product quality under the mixed scheme than under the resell-ing scheme or agency scheme.In other words,competition stimulates the firm's incentive to disclose its quali-ty.Besides,by comparing the firm's ex-ante profits under the three schemes,it is found that when the com-mission rate of the platform is extremely high,the firm can obtain more by adopting the reselling scheme;in other cases,the firm can obtain more by adopting the mixed scheme.
作者
徐鸿雁
李欣
杨玉凤
黄河
XU Hong-yannl;LI Xin;YANG Yu-feng;HUANG Hel(School of Economics and Business Administration,Chongqing University,Chongqing 400044,China;Chongqing Key Laboratory of Logistics&Supply Chain Innovation at Chongqing University,Chongqing 400044,China;School of Business,Guilin University of Electronic Technology,Guilin 541004,China)
出处
《管理科学学报》
北大核心
2025年第7期114-130,共17页
Journal of Management Sciences in China
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(72272020,72225008,71972019)
中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目(2023CDSKXYJG007)。
