摘要
针对当前水利工程安全监管体系存在多方主体协同不足、监管手段滞后、激励约束机制失衡等问题,研究构建了一种水利工程安全监管动态博弈模型,通过仿真分析揭示了不同策略下的演化规律及关键影响因素。结果表明,提高对施工单位违规行为的处罚力度可有效提升其合规施工比例,当处罚力度增加时,合规比例增长至0.94。监管成本的增加会削弱监管效果,监管成本增加时,政府严格检查比例下降至0.29。此外,政府收益的提升对社会监督参与具有正向激励作用,当收益提升时,社会监督参与比例上升至0.72。基于仿真结果,研究提出动态处罚机制、监管成本优化和社会监督激励等策略,助力实现监管的高效与可持续发展。
In response to the problems of insufficient collaboration among multiple parties,lagging regulatory measures,and imbalanced incentive and constraint mechanisms in the current water conservancy engineering safety supervision system,this study constructs a dynamic game model for water conservancy engineering safety supervision,and reveals the evolution laws and key influencing factors under different strategies through simulation analysis.The results indicate that increasing the punishment for violations by construction units can effectively improve their compliance construction ratio.When the punishment is increased,the compliance ratio increases to 0.94.The increase in regulatory costs will weaken the effectiveness of regulation.When regulatory costs increase,the proportion of strict government inspections decreases to 0.29.In addition,the increase in government revenue has a positive incentive effect on social supervision participation.When the revenue increases,the proportion of social supervision participation rises to 0.72.Based on simulation results,strategies such as dynamic penalty mechanisms,optimization of regulatory costs,and social supervision incentives are proposed to help achieve efficient and sustainable development of regulation.
作者
吴翔
WU Xiang(Ninghai County Water Conservancy Bureau(Ninghai County Township Water Conservancy Service Station),Ningbo 315600,China)
出处
《价值工程》
2025年第24期150-153,共4页
Value Engineering
关键词
演化博弈模型
水利工程
安全监管
稳定策略
evolutionary game model
water conservancy engineering
safety supervision
stability strategy
