摘要
本文通过英国内战与太平天国运动的比较案例分析,揭示了国家与精英的制度性关系与战时动员能力的内在关联。太平天国运动期间,清政府基于科举制度及文官晋升机制为士绅阶层提供明确激励,由此维系统治;英国王室在内战中缺乏有效协调不同精英群体的制度安排,归于战败。本文在比较中西制度差异对国家战时动员能力影响的同时,总结了以小规模官僚体系实现全面动员的历史经验。
This article presents a comparative case study of the English Civil War(1642-1651)and the Taiping Rebellion in Qing China(1851-1864)to analyze the divergent war outcomes through the lens of institutional relationships between the state and elites,so as to indicate the characteristics,advantages,and limitations of early modern China's mobilization capacity.During the Taiping Rebellion,the Qing government effectively mobilized the gentry class through its established bureaucratic system and civil exam system(keju),thereby connecting with broader populations.The incentive mechanisms embedded in the bureaucratic system significantly reduced transaction costs in overall mobilization,thereby sustaining political stability.In contrast,the English monarchy during the Civil War lacked institutional mechanisms to coordinate competing elite groups,while the impacts of commercial expansion and the Reformation exacerbated elite fragmentation,ultimately leading to monarchical overthrow.Although the governance crisis faced by early modern states in both conflicts demonstrate remarkable similarities,their comparative analysis as opposed to specialized single-case studies reveals fundamental differences in state institutions and deepens theoretical understanding of early modern state capacity.The comparative framework centered on early modern states can also circumvent the explanatory deficiencies inherent in direct Sino-west modernization comparisons.This approach facilitates the identification of China's institutional traditions while providing insights into the divergent modernization trajectories between China and the West,as well as offering historical insights for contemporary state mobilization capacity building.
作者
齐晨阳
陈月圆
龙登高
QI Chenyang;CHEN Yueyuan;LONG Denggao(School of Social Sciences,Tsinghua University;Business School,Beijing Normal University)
出处
《经济理论与经济管理》
北大核心
2025年第5期93-106,共14页
Economic Theory and Business Management
基金
国家资助博士后研究人员计划(GZC20240843、GZC20240120)
博士后科学基金第75批面上项目(2024M750204)的资助。
