摘要
本文运用了基于前景理论的演化博弈分析法来探究在突破性技术创新决策过程中政府对企业的影响作用。结果表明:只要突破性技术创新项目成功率较高,企业的收益大于投入与税额之和,即使没有政府补助,企业也会自发选择创新;政府补助有一定的激励作用,但效果不显著;价值函数的风险态度系数和损失规避程度的敏感性较强,适度增强企业对突破性技术创新的信心和决心是引导企业进行创新的重要举措。政府可以通过适当提高创新补助程度、降低税率以及提高监管努力程度等举措诱导企业进行创新,其中税率的敏感性最强,监管努力程度的敏感性最弱。
This paper uses the evolutionary game analysis method based on prospect theory to explore the government's influe-nce on enterprises in the decision-making process of radical technological innovation.Theoretical study and numerical simulation show that:(1)as long as the success rate of radical technology innovation projects is high and the income of enterprises is greater than the sum of input and tax,even without government subsidies,enterprises will spontaneously choose innovation strategies,and government subsidy has a certain incentive effect,but the effect is not significant;(2)the evolution of innovation system is very sensitive to diminishing marginal degree of perceived value and degree of loss aversion,so strengthening enterprise confidence in radical technology innovation is an important measure to promote enterprises to choose innovation strategy;(3)increasing innovation subsidy factor,reducing tax rate and increasing the degree of regulatory effort can all induce enterprise to choose innovation strategy,and tax rate has the strongest sensitivity,and the sensitivity of regulatory effort is the weakest.
作者
杨国忠
陈佳
Yang Guozhong;Chen Jia(School of Business,Central South University,Changsha 410083,China)
出处
《工业技术经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第5期57-64,共8页
Journal of Industrial Technological Economics
基金
湖南省自然科学基金项目“企业突破性技术创新扩散机制研究”(项目编号:2017JJ2322)
湖南省社会科学成果评审委员会课题“供给侧改革背景下湖南高新区技术创新扩散机制研究”(项目编号:XSP17YBZZ141)。
关键词
突破性技术创新
政府补助
演化博弈
前景理论
投资决策
数值仿真分析
radical technology innovation
government subsidy
prospect theory
evolutionary game theory
investment decisions
numerical simulation analysis
