摘要
运用斯坦伯格博弈方法,考虑生产者责任延伸(Extended Producer Responsibility,EPR)制度约束,构建由政府、单一生产商和单一回收商组成的决策模型,探究我国"收费-补贴"EPR政策在促进生态设计方面的政策效应。并通过比较固定收费模式、产出减费模式和投资减费模式下各决策体的最优决策和利润,探究有效的政府减费模式。研究结果表明现有固定收费EPR模式能约束生产商决策时考虑末端回收处理因素,但对开展产品生态设计有负面影响。减少收费是激励生产商进行生态设计的有效途径,政府可以通过选取合适的减费模式,取得生态设计和回收利用双赢的政策效应。同时发现不同的政策实施环境下,EPR政策具不同的生态设计引导效应。
Using Stackelberg game theory and considering the institutional constraints of EPR(Extended Producer Responsibility),a decision-making model consisting of government,single producer and single recycler was constructed,and the policy effect of "fee-subsidy" EPR policy in promoting ecological design in China was studied.By comparing the optimal decision-making and profit of each decision-maker under the fixed-fee mode,the output fee reduction mode and the investment decision-making mode,the effective government fee reduction mode was explored.The results show that the existing fixed-fee EPR mode can constrain the manufacturer’s decision-making to consider the factors of terminal recycling,but it has a negative impact on the ecological design of the product.Reducing fees is an effective way to encourage producers to design ecologically.By selecting appropriate fee reduction mode,the government can achieve a win-win policy effect of eco-design and recycling.At the same time,it is found that under different policy implementation environments,EPR policies have different ecological design guiding effects.
作者
常香云
杨芳
王珊
范体军
CHANG Xiang-yun;YANG Fang;WANG Shan;FAN Ti-jun(Business School,East China University of Science and Technology,Shanghai 200237,China)
出处
《工业工程与管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第6期157-163,172,共8页
Industrial Engineering and Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71473085,71573087,71431004)
上海市浦江人才计划(14PJC020)
关键词
生产者责任延伸
政策效应
生态设计
减费模式
extended producer responsibility
policy effect
ecological design
fee reduction mode
