摘要
逢低买入是一种新型的基于网络的动态定价方式。这种定价方式将不同的投标人联合起来以便获得数量折扣 ,它的一个特点就是商品的价格随着中标人数的增加而降低。本文采用独立私有估价假设 ,建立了一个不完全信息的动态博弈模型来解释在逢低买入机制下的买方的投标策略问题。通过求解发现 ,对于买方而言 ,存在一个弱占优策略 :投标人投低于他估价的最大被允许投标值 。
Group buying is a new kind of dynamic pricing mechanisms on the Internet The mechanism makes the bidders as a group through Internet to get the volume discounts:the more bidders bid,the lower the auctioned object's price becomes We analyze the strategy of bidders with IPV(Independent Private Value)model and build an incomplete information dynamic game model to illustrate the bidders'bidding process It is found that there exists a weakly dominant strategy If only discrete bid permitted,the strategy that a bidder bids the permitted price just no greater than his value is always weakly dominant,which means that the group buying auction is a kind of weakly incentive compatible mechanism
出处
《中国管理科学》
CSSCI
2002年第5期1-7,共7页
Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金
国家杰出青年科学基金 (7982 5 10 2 )
国家自然科学基金
香港RGC资助项目 (79910 161897)
关键词
投标策略
定价机制
逢低买入
网上拍卖
bidding strategy
dynamic pricing mechanism
group buying
online auction
