摘要
在允许"价格-质量"投标的多因素投标环境下,设计了一种多因素采购组合拍卖的动态机制(规则),提出了竞争均衡打分的概念。构建了多因素采购组合拍卖动态机制的优化模型,讨论了拍卖规则和优化模型实现互补松弛条件之间的必然联系。基本结论是:在本拍卖机制中,投标者采用最佳近视反应投标策略,将使拍卖的分配结果趋向最优,最终在拍卖结束时实现系统效用最大化。
We design an iterative procurement combinatorial auction （CA） rules based on price-quality bidding pattern, then construct the conception ＂competitive equilibrium score＂ （CES） to formulate optimization problem for the quality-related CA mechanism. By applying CES and a linear program plus its dual, we model the objective function as allocation efficiency and constraints according to the auction rules. The model implements a primal-dual algorithm for the auction, computing a feasible primal and a feasible dual that satisfy complementary slackness conditions when auction terminates, meanwhile allocation efficiency is achieved in the iterative procurement CA.
出处
《中国管理科学》
CSSCI
2008年第1期104-110,共7页
Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70701040)
关键词
多因素采购拍卖
组合拍卖
动态机制设计
multi-attribute procurement auction
combinatorial auction
dynamic mechanism design
