摘要
在静态定价机制下,基于Bertrand模型,研究双寡头商家期限团购的定价策略。首先考虑两商家都没有开展团购业务时的定价决策,此时商家只有传统的门店销售渠道,得出了它们的最优门店价格。然后考虑其中一位商家开展了团购业务,此时该商家有门店销售和团购销售两个渠道,得出了该商家的最优团购价格,并证明了最优团购价格是顾客转移比例和团购网站收取的佣金比例的增函数。最后,通过算例分析展示了两商家的最优门店价格和团购价格,以及门店价格、团购价格、销量和利润关于主要参数的敏感性,并得出开展团购业务可以为商家带来更多需求,提高其利润,实现商家和消费者的共赢。
This paper studies the term group buying pricing strategy for duopoly merchants based on Bertrand model with the static pricing mechanism.First,we consider the pricing decision when both merchants do not adopt the group buying,so the merchants only have the traditional store sale channel,and the optimal store prices are obtained.Then,we consider one of the duopoly adopts the group buying,so this merchant has two sale channels：store and grouping buying.We obtain his optimal group buying price,and prove that the optimal group buying price is an increasing function of the customer transfer ratio and the commission ratio charged by the group buying website.At last,an example shows the optimal store prices and the group buying price for the duopoly,and analyzes the sensitivities of the store prices,grouping buying price,the sales volume and the profits on the key parameters.Finally we conclude that adopting group buying business can increase demand and profit for the merchants,and can realize a win-win situation both for the merchants and the customers.
出处
《系统工程》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2016年第4期62-69,共8页
Systems Engineering
基金
2014年度广州市属高校科研项目(1201431002)
广东省哲学社会科学"十二五"规划2013年度学科共建项目(GD13XGL08)
广东省教育厅育苗工程科研项目(2013WYM 0066)
