期刊文献+

养老PPP项目治理机制研究——基于不完全契约理论 被引量:4

Research on the Governance Mechanism of Pension PPP Project-Based on Incomplete Contracting Theory
在线阅读 下载PDF
导出
摘要 在人口老龄化愈发严峻的形势下,中国养老产业度过了非理性繁荣期,但问题重重,采用PPP模式支持养老产业发展成为一种有效的政策选择。"PPP不是一场婚礼而是婚姻",后续的治理至关重要,养老PPP项目治理机制是基于契约关系的内部治理机制和基于行政职权的外部治理机制的有机体。项目本质是以契约为纽带的合作,且项目契约具有不完全性。该文从第一代和第二代不完全契约理论出发构建出刚柔相济的缔约机制、产权清晰的激励机制和高效有力的监督机制,来完善养老PPP项目的治理以应对银发浪潮的冲击。 China's pension industry has went through an irrational boom period and there exists problems under the serious situation of the ageing population. Using PPP model to support the development of Pension Industry is becoming an effective policy choice. "PPP is not a wedding but a marriage",and subsequent governance is essential. The governance mechanism of pension PPP project is an organic combination of internal governance mechanism based on contractual relationship and external governance mechanism based on administrative authority. The essence of pension PPP project is a cooperation which is linked by contract and the contract is incomplete. This article establishes the governance mechanism from the first and second generation incomplete contracting theory like this: the contracting mechanism combines hardness with softness; under the incentive mechanism,the property rights are clear and the supervise mechanism is efficient and powerful. Its purpose is to improve the governance of the pension PPP project and then combat the impact of seniors.
作者 闫明星 范君晖 YAN Mingxing, FAN Junhui(School of management, Shanghai University of Engineering Science, Shanghai201620, Chin)
出处 《中国发展》 2018年第1期66-72,共7页 China Development
关键词 养老产业 PPP 不完全契约 再谈判 剩余控制权 pension industry PPP incomplete contract renegotiation residual rights of control
  • 相关文献

参考文献8

二级参考文献163

  • 1聂辉华.交易费用经济学:过去、现在和未来——兼评威廉姆森《资本主义经济制度》[J].管理世界,2004,20(12):146-153. 被引量:112
  • 2杨瑞龙,聂辉华.不完全契约理论:一个综述[J].经济研究,2006,41(2):104-115. 被引量:308
  • 3赵国富,王守清.基础设施BOT/PPP项目中的政府责任研究[J].商场现代化,2007(05Z):194-195. 被引量:19
  • 4Hart, O. and J. Moore. Incomplete Contracts and Ownership: Some New Thoughts[J]. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceeds, 2007,97(2).
  • 5Hart, Oliver. Reference Points and the Theory of the Firm[J]. Economica, 2008,75 (299).
  • 6Hart, O. and J. Moore. Contracts as reference points[J]. Quarterly Journal of Econom- ics, 2008,123(1).
  • 7Fehr, Ernst,Oliver D. Hart, Christian Zehnder. Contracts as Reference Points.. Experi- mental Evidence [J]. American Economic Review, 2009a, Forthcoming.
  • 8Fehr, Ernst, Oliver D. Hart, Christian Zehnder. Contracts, Reference Points, and Competition--Behavioral Consequences of the Fundamental Transformation[J]. Journal of the European Economic Association, 2009b, 7 (2--3).
  • 9Hart, Oliver. Hold-up, Asset Ownership and Reference Points[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2009,124(1).
  • 10Hart, O. and B. Holmstrom. A Theory of Firm Scope[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2010, Forthcoming.

共引文献445

同被引文献40

引证文献4

二级引证文献10

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部