基于讨价还价博弈的经理人激励契约研究被引量：16

Research on the incentive contract based on bargaining games

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摘要本文在代理人市场是非完全竞争的现实条件下,假设委托代理双方基于重视讨价还价过程的激励契约进行谈判.依据讨价还价过程,建立并求解了无限期Rubinstein轮流出价讨价还价博弈,并利用破裂点分析了代理人的机会主义支付,最后根据唯一子博弈精炼纳什均衡和破裂点为委托人和代理人提供了一份非线性均衡契约.在均衡契约中,委托人获得固定的企业净利润,代理人获得剩余部分,通过这种方式把企业绩效、代理人的努力水平和代理人的薪酬结合到一起.基于Rubi璐tein讨价还价博弈得到的激励契约,做到了在考虑到代理人利益的前提下实现委托人利益的最大化,这样的激励契约是有效率的,更是均衡的,也为激励契约的设计提供一种更符合现实情况的可供借鉴的方式. Under the realistic condition of the agent market is incomplete competitive, this paper assumes the principal-agent two sides negotiate based on incentive contract attaches great importance to the bargaining process, in which the principal bids first, then the agent counter-offer. Based on the bargaining process, the paper established and solved indefinitely Rubinstein alternating offers bargaining game, while the agent＇s opportunism pay is analyzed. Then a nonlinear balanced contract is provided which based on the Nash equilibrium and the breakdown point. In the balanced contract, the principal receive a fixed profit and the agent get the remaining portion, in this way, the agent＇ pay is related the business performance closely. The incentive contract based on bargaining games maximize the benefits of the principal while maximize the agent＇s benefits, so the contract is balanced and efficient, it also provides a more realistic and referable way to design incentive contract.

作者李华李恩极孙秋柏王宏波

机构地区辽宁科技大学工商管理学院中国社会科学院数量经济与技术经济研究所

出处《系统工程理论与实践》 EI CSSCI CSCD 北大核心 2015年第9期2280-2287,共8页 Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基金国家自然科学基金(71371092 71301015) 中国博士后基金(2014M561134)

关键词 Rubinstein讨价还价模型委托代理模型激励契约破裂风险 Rubinstein bargaining model principal-agent model incentive contract risk of breakdown

分类号 F224.32 [经济管理—国民经济]

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