摘要
农村公共品供给是新农村社区建设顺利进行的重要保障,财力不足已成为制约农村公共产品供给的瓶颈,"零税费时代"这一问题更加突出。在农村公共品供给不足的背景下,提升农户参与新农村社区公共品供给的意愿是一个有研究价值的问题。基于农户自愿供给的角度,建立了信息对称和信息不对称背景下农户参与农村社区公共品供给的博弈模型。研究表明,农户在单价段博弈中容易陷入"囚徒困境",而在无限次重复博弈过程中可以实现"帕累托"最优。应该采取典型示范、增加农村社区中社会资本的存量、发展民间组织、完善农户的需求偏好表达机制、实现多主体供给等多方面的激励机制,使农户之间的非合作博弈走向合作博弈。
Rural public goods supply is the important guarantee for the new rural community construction. Financial resources shortage has become the bottleneck restraining rural public product supply, which is more outstanding in the ＂Zero taxes age＂. In the shortage of rural public goods supply background, how to improve the farmers＇ participation in the public goods supply of new rural community is valuable. Based on view of voluntary supply, this paper established a game model for symmetrical farmers and asymmetric farmer participating in the rural community public goods supply. There is a conclusion that farmers are easy to fall into the ＂prisoner＇s dilemma＂ in the unit price period of game, but they can realize ＂pareto＂ optimality in the infinitely repeated game process. We should take incentive mechanism such as typical demonstration, increasing social capital stock in the rural communities, developing folk organization, perfecting the farmers demand preference expression mechanism and realizing multi-agent supply. Only in this way can non- cooperative games move towards cooperation.
出处
《生态经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第7期96-100,共5页
Ecological Economy
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(70861004)
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(10YJCZH245)
关键词
新农村社区
博弈
农村公共品
社会资本
new rural community
game
rural public goods
social capital
