摘要
采用演化博弈方法分析流域水生态系统动态演化过程。通过理论假设和模型分析发现:在水质一定条件下,参与人的策略选择由不同行为的支付水平决定;当参与人策略为外生变量时,水质与参与人混合策略之间存在稳定的演化均衡。对流域水资源系统进行动态分析,发现在水资源具备再生条件下,政府可以根据不同的水质状况选择不同的税收和补贴政策,改变参与者的策略选择,系统才能演化到最优的均衡水平。
In this paper we analyze the dynamic evolution of water system in river basin by using the evolutionary game theory. Through analyzing the theoretical hypothesis and model analysis, we find that the strategic choice of players is decided by payoffs of actions when water quality under certain conditions, there exist stable evolutionary equilibrium between water quality and players mixed strategy when payoffs of player＇ actions are exogenous. By analyzing combined system dynamics in water resource, we find that government can choose appropriate taxes and subsidies according to different water quality state if resource of river basin ecology has the ability to regenerate, so that stakeholders have to change their strategic choices, which make the combined system evolve to the optimal equilibrium.
出处
《生态经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第6期147-149,154,共4页
Ecological Economy
基金
国家自然科学基金(70973010)
国家自然科学基金(71373022)
河北省社会科学基金(HB14GL029)
河北省教育厅研究基地项目"自然资源资产资本化管理研究"
关键词
流域
水资源
利益相关者
演化博弈
river basin
water resource
stakeholder
evolutionary game
