摘要
本文将水权的水量权和污染权有机结合,提出建立一种“准市场”的水权交易模型。始终把保障河道内流量需求和保证水质作为环境约束条件,把水质影响集成到水量配置中,结合政府管制与市场机制两种配置方式的优势,建立了兼顾两种水权的准市场交易模型。通过解决最优控制问题研究了中国水权交易市场均衡问题,求解得出水市场均衡Nash解,发现负外部性随自变量线性变化,邻近水用户之间的外部效应是递增的,而且越到下游地区越明显;也发现了交易成本是决定水权交易市场效率的最重要的因素;最后,得出了一些对于中国水权准市场交易有意义的启示。
A water rights tradable model for quasi - market is established based on the integration of water quantity right and water pollution fight. In the model Instream Flow Need（IFN） in fiver and water quality standard are set as the environmental constraint conditions and the influence of water quality is integrated into the allocation of water quantity. The effects of government regulation as wall as the mechanism of market are both to be considered. The market equilibrium of tradable water rights in China is studied by solving the optimal control problem, and the Nash solution of the market equilibrium is obtained. It is found that the negative externalities of adjacent water user increase linearly from upstream to downstream. It also shows that the transaction costs are the most important factors in determining the efficiency of the water market.
出处
《水利学报》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2006年第4期492-498,共7页
Journal of Hydraulic Engineering
基金
国家自然科学基金优秀研究青年项目资助(71121001)
中科院知识创新重大项目"黄土高原水土保持与可持续发展生态建设试验示范研究"
关键词
水权
准市场设计
政府管制
外部性
市场均衡
water right
quasi-market design
government regulation
externalities
market equilibrium
