摘要
国企经营者合谋行为的产生主要原因是由于经济管理制度、企业制度、国企经营者聘任激励与监督约束机制等的不完善。本文从委托———代理理论和有关制度方面深入分析了合谋问题产生原因 ,建立了国企经营者和主管官员合谋的博弈模型 ,从完善公司治理结构和经营者 (职业经理 )市场聘任与监督约束、加强对经营者的财务监督和合谋行为的惩罚约束。
The main reasons for the joint corruption behavior of Executives of State-owned Enterprises stem mainly from the imperfection of the economic management system, enterprise system, and mechanism of recruitment, motivation and supervision and restraint of executives of state-owned enterprises. The paper delves into the reasons of joint corruption from the viewpoints of the principal-agent theory and system, builds the game model of the joint corruption between the executives of state-owned enterprise and government officials in charge and puts forward several countermeasures to overcome the problem, such as perfection of corporate governance, market recruitment and supervision over executives (professional managers), intensify financial supervision over executives, and penalty of the joint corruption, improvement of the restraint through the public opinion of the society, the restraint through the establishment of the system of office affairs opening system, etc.
出处
《西安交通大学学报（社会科学版）》
2002年第1期58-61,68,共5页
Journal of Xi'an Jiaotong University：Social Sciences
基金
陕西省科委软科学研究基金项目 ( 99KR0 8)
