摘要
如何防范国企经营者和主管部门官员之间合谋侵占国有企业的生产剩余,一直是政府部门和学术界关注的焦点问题。本文根据Laffont和Martimort等在委托-代理框架下提出的分权制思想,构建了防范国企经营者合谋的"囚徒困境"博弈模型。但由于基于"囚徒困境"博弈所构建的双重审核机制可能产生过高的审查成本,且其实施受到主管官员有限责任的限制,因此通过引入不对称信息进一步改进了"囚徒困境"博弈,使不合谋的均衡结果能在更宽松的条件下实现。
Based on the ideas of decentralization brought forward by Laffont Martimort in the principle-agent frame,this paper proposes a model of prisoner＇s dilemma game to prevent the collusion of executives of state-owned enterprises.However,the double-audit mechanism based on prisoner＇s dilemma game may result in exorbitant audit cost,and its implement would subject to the restriction of limited liability of officers.Therefore,through introducing asymmetry information,it improves the prisoner＇s dilemma game,and makes the non-collusion equilibrium achieved in more relaxed conditions.
出处
《技术经济》
2010年第10期99-102,129,共5页
Journal of Technology Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金项目(10CGLO14)
冶金工业过程系统科学湖北省重点实验室(武汉科技大学)开放基金资助(B201004)
关键词
“囚徒困境”博弈
不对称信息
NASH均衡
国企经营者
prisoner＇s dilemma game
asymmetric information
Nash equilibrium
executive of state-owned enterprise
