摘要
企业内博弈格局决定了企业行为特点 ,我国转型时期由于融资制度、产权结构及改革舆论等方面的影响 ,国有企业内博弈格局严重失衡并现实地体现为“经营者控制”风险。“经营者控制”导致企业内部治理结构扭曲 ,要素所有者收益分配不均衡 ,降低了国有资产的收益率 ,已成为改革的重大挑战。国企改革必须着眼于企业内博弈格局再塑 ,加快经营者市场及企业信息的规模披露 ,强化外部监管 ,推动企业各要素所有者收益分配的合理化。
The game layout inside state-owned enterprises determined enterprises action character.In China,During the transitional period,the game layout unbalance embodies “managercontrolled”risk in state-owned enterprises.“Manager control”twisted governing strctures inside enterprises,led to profit distribution unbalance of the owners,decreased yielding rate of state-ownet asset and became a great challenge to the reform,State-owned enterprises reform should focus on reshaping game layout inside enterprises,quicken the step of revealing information about manager market and enterprises,strengthen external supervision and rationalize profit distribution.
出处
《财经科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2000年第6期58-62,共5页
Finance & Economics
关键词
经营者控制
风险防范
企业
博弈
国有企业
transitional period
game theory of enterprises
manager control
