摘要
大型工程项目除了完成建设任务,还担负着促进本国企业的技术创新,提升本国产业竞争力的使命。对于含有先进技术水平的物资采购,会优先从本国选择供应商,而本国的某些企业具有不确定的开发和生产能力,因此项目将面临产品成本增加及交货期延迟的风险。针对供应商的生产成本信息私有,且供应商为了降低成本提供的努力水平不可观测等问题,设计了一组基于转移支付和生产成本的激励合约不仅能反映供应商真实的成本信息,并能使其付出更高的努力水平。
Large-scale construction projects require advanced strategic resources and often face contradictions between urgent demand and short supply.The procurement of such strategic resources is critical to the success of large-scale construction projects.While excessively relying on foreign advanced technology,domestic enterprises often become heteronomy.Therefore,the large-scale project has an important mission to promote the innovation of native firms in order to enhance the whole industrial competitiveness.In the process of procuring strategic resources,companies implementing the large-scale project involve three primary risks.The first risk is that domestic firms have limited capacity and cannot ensure exact cost and delivery time.The second risk is asymmetric information about cost and technology between supplier and the domestic company.The third risk is that suppliers tend to exert less effort under opportunism.These three risks can cause cost overrun and late schedule,which greatly increase project cost.In fact,we can reduce the uncertainty of cost and delivery time by inspecting supplier＇s production cost,technology level,and production process.Fortunately,most suppliers do not want to release the information to domestic firms.In the absence of motivation,the supplier will tend to exaggerate production cost and reduce effort.According to principal-agent theory and incentive theory,the paper designs a menu contract depending on the transfer payment and cost compensation.This paper also demonstrates the feasibility of the optimal incentive mechanism under the private information.The incentive mechanism is feasible from the aspects of identifying the internal information about the suppliers and encouraging the vendors to pay the required level of efforts when some kinds of conditions are met.Further,the paper solves the form of optimal contracts for the procurement of strategic resources.Secondly,based on the analysis of the parameters,our proposed incentive contract can motivate enterprises to spend more offorts in improving technical capability than the traditional contract constrained with the condition of asymmetric information.However,the difference is not notable for low-level contracts.In addition,the project company can screen supplier＇s real technical information in order to have a better control of purchasing cost.In summary,the analysis results not only prove the feasibility and validity of incentive contract for the procurement of strategic resources in large-scale project but also theoretically resolve problems such as risk control,information rents and cost compensation faced by the project company.The timings of this study offer some important guidance for companies to procure large-scale projects.
出处
《管理工程学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第1期179-184,共6页
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金
国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(70831002)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(NUST
2012YBXM012)
关键词
激励理论
大型工程
工程采购
incentive theory
large-scale construction project
project＇s procurement
