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政治关联影响企业上交的排污费吗——基于重点环境监控企业的经验证据 被引量:6

What the Discharge Fees Paid by the Enterprise is Affected by the Political Connections ——Based on the Key Environmental Monitoring Enterprises' Empirical Evidence
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摘要 排污费是政府为保护环境、维护社会利益而制定的重要控制措施,但是很多企业通过建立政治关联降低上缴排污费。基于企业寻租理论及可持续发展理论,通过对我国重点环境监控的上市公司有关政治关联背景的高管人员的研究发现,政治关联会对企业获得政府环境优惠政策产生影响,并且与排污费成负向相关关系。监管部门应建立健全环境监管机制,限制有政治关联背景人员的行为,在选定政策免征时制定完善的规则。 The pollution discharge fees, as one of important measures set by the government to protect environment and to maintain the social interests, have large amount and effects in many companies. Cause the favorable relationships established with the government is an important channel to reduce the discharge fees, the problem that whether the discharge fees can be reduced due to the political connections or not is worth studying. Therefore, this paper, associated with the political background senior executives as the research object and combined with the theory of the sustainable development and the rent-seeking, showed that the political connections have exerted an influence on the government's preferential policy and have negative correlations with the discharge fees. Supervision departments should establish and improve the environmental supervision mechanism, restrict the political background the association personnel's behavior, make perfect rules in the selected tax policy.
作者 姚圣 程娜
出处 《经济与管理》 CSSCI 2014年第1期56-61,共6页 Economy and Management
基金 国家自然科学基金(71102163) 中国博士后特别资助基金项目(2012T50529) 中国博士后科学基金面上资助项目(2011M500977)
关键词 政治关联 排污费 环境 优惠政策 Political connections Discharge fees Environment Preferential policy
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参考文献14

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