摘要
安全监管是提高煤矿安全生产水平的有效途径.运用演化博弈理论构建了单一煤矿群体安全生产行为博弈模型和非对称煤矿安全监察博弈模型,通过复制动态方程的动态趋势和稳定性分析对煤矿安全监管进行了深入的探讨.结果表明:降低煤矿安全生产成本,降低监察成本和提高监察效率,提高惩罚力度等都将使煤矿安全监管博弈向着良好的方向演化.
The safety management is the effective way evolutionary game theory, the authors construct the single and asymmetric coal mine safety supervision game model. to improve coal mine safety production level. By using coal mine group safety production behavior game model Through the replication dynamic equation of the dynamic trend and stability analysis, the coal mine safety supervision is thoroughly discussed. The results show that the measures including reducing the coal mine safety production cost,reducing the monitoring cost,improving the monitoring efficiency, and improving the penalty are benefit to coal mine safety supervision game toward the good direction evolution.
出处
《河南科学》
2012年第12期1801-1805,共5页
Henan Science
关键词
安全生产管理
煤矿安全
演化博弈
演化稳定策略
复制动态方程
safety production management
coal mine safety
evolution game
evolutionary stable strategy
replication dynamic equation
