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我国煤矿安全生产与监管中的三方博弈分析 被引量:21

Analysis of three-parties game theory in mining safety supervision in China
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摘要 煤炭开采是我国最大的高危行业之一,本文针对我国煤矿安全事故频繁的现状和特点,从煤矿的内部管理与政府对煤矿的监督两方面入手,深入分析了我国煤矿安全监管体制中行为原因而存在的问题,从而建立了我国煤矿安全管理中基于政府、煤矿和职工的三方博弈模型。根据博弈模型的求解结果,建立了能使三方达到均衡的加强煤矿安全生产和完善监管体制的几点建议。 Coal mining is one of chinese most dangerous career. This paper discusses the situation and characteristics of frequent mining accidents on safety in China, interior management and supervision, analyzing problems due to behavior reasons which exist in mining accidents supervision system. Based on three parties of government, coal - master and workers, the model of game theory is built up in mining supervision on the safety and administration. At last, it puts forward some advices for the reinforcement of coal mine safe production and the perfection management which made three parties in equilibrium based on the result for the model.
作者 周忠科 徐亮
出处 《中国安全生产科学技术》 CAS 2006年第4期96-100,共5页 Journal of Safety Science and Technology
关键词 煤矿安全 安全生产 安全监管 博弈分析 mining safety safety exloration safety supervision game theory
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参考文献5

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