摘要
从有限理性角度出发,基于进化博弈理论,建立了煤矿安全管理与矿工违章行为进化博弈模型,分析了博弈双方的复制动态方程及动态进化过程,揭示了博弈双方的行为特征及其对稳定状态的影响。结果表明:矿工遵章作业的正常收益、对矿工的奖惩力度和煤矿的管理成本是影响博弈结果的主要因素,在此基础上提出了提高煤矿安全管理效率和规范矿工违章行为的对策。
From the view of bounded rationality, base on the evolutionary game theory, a evolutionary game mode of the mine safety management and the miner violation behavior was established, the replicated dynamic equation and the dynamic evolution process of the both gaming parties were analyzed and the behavior features of the tow gaming parties affected to the stability status were revealed. The results showed that the normal benefit of the miner obeyed regulation operation, bonus-penalty system of miner and mine management cost would be the main factors affected to the gaming results. Base on the circumstances, the countermeasures were provided to improve the mine safety management efficiency and the specifications of the miner＇s violation behaviors.
出处
《煤炭工程》
北大核心
2013年第1期131-133,共3页
Coal Engineering
基金
河北省社会科学发展研究课题"河北省煤矿区队安全文化建设及其评价研究"(201203057)
关键词
矿工违章
安全管理
进化博弈
对策
miner＇s violation behaviors
safety management
evolutionary game
countermeasures
