摘要
为研究矿业生产过程中安全监察工作对安全生产干预的有效性,建立了安全生产与监察的博弈模型。结合生物进化理论,建立进化博弈模型的复制者动态方程;应用动力系统稳定性理论,研究了安全监察博弈中策略选择的进化稳定性。研究结果表明,博弈的动力系统不满足自控性,在原有的约束激励条件下,安全监察博弈模型不存在进化稳定策略;为有效控制矿业工程中的安全生产,除一般意义下的约束激励措施外,必须对监督者的策略集进行下限约束,才能有效保证生产者选择安全生产策略。
The effect of safe production supervision in mining engineering is studied in the paper,and a game model between safe production and supervision is built.By using theory of evolutionary,the replicator dynamical equations constitute the dynamic system and evolutionary stable strategy is studied.The result shows that dynamical system is unsteady without extra conditions and evolutionary stable strategy of the game theory does not exist.In order to guarantee the safe production,a lower limit should be added to the set of supervisor strategy.If the probability of inspectors executing the supervision strategy exceeds the lower limit,mining engineering tends to execute the strategy of safety in the long run.
出处
《山东科技大学学报（自然科学版）》
CAS
2012年第5期37-40,共4页
Journal of Shandong University of Science and Technology(Natural Science)
关键词
安全生产
监察
进化博弈
纳什均衡
动态系统
稳定性
safe production
supervision
evolutionary game
Nash equilibrium
dynamical system
stability
