摘要
针对不同类型客户需求,研究了由一个供应商和一个制造商组成的二级供应链围绕单一产品的客户需求,在产品质量、价格、提前期相互竞争下的供应商与制造商Stackelberg非合作协调博弈问题。结果表明:当供应商处于领导地位时,制造商依据产品质量、价格、提前期的相互关系,可将客户需求分为质量敏感型和质量不敏感型两大类,并分别选择了供应链双方协调下的制造商最优产品质量水平、销售价格、订货提前期及利润;供应商则在制造商选择的基础上,通过BOM表,进一步确定了其提供单位产品所需某种原材料及全部原料的经济批量及批发单价并最终确定其原材料批发总价、总成本及总利润。
This paper studies a two-stage supply chain Stackelberg non-cooperative coordination game between supplier and manufacturer based on a single product customer demand when product quality, price and lead time compete to each other based on different types of customer demand. The results show that when supplier is the lead, the manufacturer divides the customer demand into two categories which are quality non-sensitive customer demand and quality sensitive customer demand based on the relationship between product quality, price and lead time. Then under the supply chain coordination, the man- ufacturer chooses the optimal level of product quality, sale price, lead time and profits. Based on the choice of the manufacturer, the supplier further selects economic quantities and wholesale price of raw material required by the single product through the BOM table and ultimately determines total wholesale price of raw materials, total cost and total profit.
出处
《软科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第8期136-140,共5页
Soft Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70872091)
高等学校博士点专项基金项目(20090201110031)
关键词
供应链协调
客户质量敏感需求
供应商
制造商
价格
提前期
supply chain coordination
customer sensitive quality demand
supplier
manufacturer
price
lead time
