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质量与价格竞争供应链的均衡与协调策略研究 被引量:111

Research on equilibriums and coordination strategies of supply chains with quality and price competition
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摘要 研究了一个两条竞争的二层供应链模型,每个制造商通过各自的分销商向顾客提供产品,供应链在产品质量和价格两个方面进行竞争.文中首先分析了三种情景中供应链竞争的均衡解:无协调情景、混合情景(仅有一条供应链采用协调策略)和协调情景.通过分析发现协调策略对于每条供应链都是一个占优策略,并且质量成本优势越大供应链在采用协调策略后的收益越大.但当两条供应链同时采用协调策略后,所有供应链的利润有可能均小于无协调情景中的利润,即可能出现囚徒困境现象.供应链协调加剧了市场竞争,使产品平均质量提高和市场中顾客总量增加.供应链协调总是使顾客受益. In this paper, we consider a market with two competing supply chains with common customers, each consisting of one manufacture and one retailer. We assume that supply chain competing on two sides: products' qualities and prices. At first we analyze the supply chain competition results in three scenarios: un- coordinated scenario, hybrid scenario (only one supply chain adopts coordination strategy) and coordinated scenario. We show that coordinating supply chain decisions is a dominant strategy for each supply chain. The coordinated supply chain has more benefits when the supply chain has more advantages of quality cost. However, supply chain profits may decrease when both channels coordinate their decisions, i. e. , there may occur the classical prisoner' s dilemma in the supply chain system. The competitive intensity is greater under supply chain coordination equilibrium. The average quality levels are higher and customer amount increase in the coordination scenario. Customers benefit a lot from the coordination strategy.
出处 《管理科学学报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2009年第3期56-64,共9页 Journal of Management Sciences in China
基金 国家自然科学基金重点项目(70432001) 中国博士后科学基金资助项目(20070410166) 上海市重点学科建设资助项目(B210)
关键词 供应链管理 协调 一体化 质量竞争 价格竞争 supply chain management coordination integration quality competition price competition
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参考文献15

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