摘要
讨论了产品召回中的成本分担和质量激励问题.通过引入根源分析的成本分担合同,在考虑线性市场需求的情况下,制造商和供应商都可以通过努力来改进产品质量,运用上模博弈理论证明了分散式供应链的纳什最优均衡解的存在性.根源分析的成本分担合同使制造商和供应商的努力水平、质量、价格以及市场份额取得最优,且最大化了各自的利润.在根源分析成本可忽略的情况下,供应链是协调的.
This paper discusses the cost-sharing and quality-improvement incentives in the product recall. By introducing the root cause analysis cost-sharing contract, assumed that the manufacturer and supplier face the linear market demand, and all of the two firms could make the efforts improve product quality. The optimal Nash Equilibrium existence in the decentralized supply chain had been proved by using insights from supermodular game theory. Under the root cause analysis cost-sharing contract, the product quality, quality improvement efforts, retail price and wholesale price, product market share all obtained to first best level, their own profits had also been maximized. And in the case that the cost of root cause analysis can be ignored, the supply chain is coordinated.
出处
《系统工程理论与实践》
EI
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2012年第7期1400-1407,共8页
Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice
基金
国家自然科学基金(70871125)
英国British Academy Grant(SG 090839)资助
关键词
产品召回
质量激励
上模博弈
决策优化
products recall
quality improvement incentives
supermodular game
decision optimization
