摘要
针对一个由单供应商和单制造商组成的二级供应链,在同时考虑产品召回和不确定市场需求的情形下,研究供应链保险合约下的订货决策以及实现供应链协调的最优保险合约决策。研究表明,供应链保险合约可以提高制造商的最优订货量以及利润,同时,存在一个最优且唯一的保险合约来实现供应链协调,但最优保险合约和订货量与产品召回概率、市场需求大小和市场波动性有关。具体而言,在供应链协调情形下,随着产品召回概率、市场需求大小或市场波动性的增加,最优保险费用先增大后减少;在保险合约下,最优订货量随产品召回概率、市场波动性或制造商承担损失比例的增加而减少,但随平均市场需求的增大而增加。
Considering a supply chain consisting of a supplier and a manufacturer,we investigate the ordering decision under supply chain insurance contract and the optimal insurance decision which can coordinate the supply chain when the manufacturer is faced with uncertain market demand and product recall risks.We show that the supply chain insurance contract can enhance the manufacturer＇s optimal ordering quantity and profit,and there exists an optimal and unique insurance contract which can coordinate the supply chain,while the product recall probability,market size and market volatility have significant effects on the optimal insurance charge and optimal ordering quantity.Specifically,the product recall probability,market size or market volatility has an inverted U-shaped effect on the optimal insurance premium under supply chain coordination.However,with the increase of the product recall probability,market volatility or the ratio of loss that the manufacturer bears,the optimal ordering quantity decreases,while with the increase of market size,the optimal ordering quantity increases.
作者
戴宾
苏洋洋
DAI Bin,SU Yang-yang(Economics and Management School, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, Chin)
出处
《系统工程》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第10期123-130,共8页
Systems Engineering
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71671133
71301122
91746206)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(武汉大学人文社会科学自主科研项目)
关键词
供应链保险合约
产品召回
不确定市场需求
供应链协调
Supply Chain Insurance Contract
Product Recall
Uncertain Demand
Supply Chain Coordination
