经理薪酬激励风险效应与风险治理研究述评被引量：4

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摘要自2008年爆发国际金融危机以来,因薪酬激励不当而引发的与风险相关的代理问题(risk-related agency problem)及其治理,开始成为经理薪酬激励研究的新热点。本文在梳理相关文献的基础上,详细阐述了经理薪酬激励的风险效应和风险治理问题,以期为我国国企高管薪酬管理与规制提供借鉴与启示。

作者黄再胜

机构地区南京政治学院上海分院

出处《外国经济与管理》 CSSCI 北大核心 2012年第5期67-74,共8页 Foreign Economics & Management

基金国家社会科学基金青年项目<政府规制视角下的国企高管薪酬管理制度改革研究>(编号:2010CGL056)

关键词经理薪酬薪酬激励风险管理风险效应风险治理

分类号 F270 [经济管理—企业管理]

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参考文献30

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二级参考文献37

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