新侵权责任法实施背景下环境责任保险发展的博弈分析被引量：3

Analysis with Game Theory for the Development of Enviormental Liability Insurance against the Implementation of New Tort Liability Law

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摘要如何发展环境责任保险,使其更好地促进地方环境保护,是当前社会的一个热点问题。本文通过经济学的重要工具博弈论(Game Theory)来对上述的环境责任保险系统进行一个层层深入的分析,在做了一定的外部假设条件下,一共提供了四阶段的动态博弈模型,其中一阶段分析表明企业在无外部约束的情况下必然会选择污染型生产;二阶段分析表明在有环境责任保险的参与后,污染成本转为由保险公司所承担,企业的行为没有受到约束;三阶段分析模型经过修正后使得保险公司可以采用一个威胁,即可以拒绝为污染型生产进行赔偿;四阶段分析表明只有政府的参与才能使企业的生产行为受到完全的约束。针对各阶段分析的结果,本文结尾提出了相应的建议。 How to develop the environmental liability insurance,and make it better promote local environmental protection effectively,is a very complicated problem which should be paid more attention to.Based on the Game Theory,this paper tries to comprehensively analyze the relationship between the Production enterprise and other participants.After completing some important external hypothesis,we can conclude four dynamic game theory trees from our analysis.The first one tells us that the enterprise will determinately choose the pollution-type production if no one constraints their behavior.The second one shows us that after the insurance company joining in the game theory tree,the cost of pollution will transfer from the pollution enterprise to the insurance company.From the third tree,we know that if we modify the second game theory tree,the insurance company can send a threat,which means if the enterprise chooses the pollution-type production,the insurance company will refuse to compensate for loss.At the last tree,we know that only the government＇s participation can constraint the enterprise＇s behavior.At the end of this paper,we offer some important advice based on our analysis.

作者张瑞纲许谨良

机构地区上海财经大学金融学院

出处《保险职业学院学报》 2011年第3期5-9,共5页 Journal of Insurance Professional College

基金上海财经大学研究生科研创新项目基金赞助项目编号为:CXJJ-2010-334

关键词新侵权责任法环境责任保险博弈分析环保型型生产污染型生产 New Tort liability Law Environmental Liability Insurance Game Theory Environmental Production Environmental-pollution Production

分类号 F84 [经济管理—保险]

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