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基于最优反应均衡的渠道数量折扣模型及实验分析 被引量:5

The Research on Quantity Discount Model of Channel Based on Quantal Response Equilibrium and Experiment
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摘要 最优反应均衡是在有限理性条件下对纳什均衡的发展,传统对渠道协调的研究关注契约设计,数量折扣是理论研究较多的机制,但在实践中的结果与理论有所偏差。基于此,将最优反应均衡引入到渠道协调数量折扣的模型中,建立依据反应函数的策略概率选择分析框架,修正对零售商理性程度的认识。通过理论分析重新求解数量折扣形式,发现随着博弈者理性程度的不同,契约形式发生变化;通过实验证明数量折扣机制协调渠道的有效性,发现实验数据与最优反应均衡模型更加吻合,重新对契约机制具体参数进行制定,估计出零售商的理性程度系数,在该系数下的渠道协调机制不同于传统的理论预测结果,进而为更加合理的制定渠道协调的机制契约提供理论和实证基础。 Quantal response equilibrium is a modified method of Nash equilibrium under the framework of bounder rationality. Traditional researches on channel coordination are primarily focused on contract design,and quantity discounts are more of a mechanism for theoretical study,however,the findings and theories are biased in practice. This paper introduces the quantal response equilibrium theory into quantity discount model of channel coordination,builds the choice analysis framework based on the reaction function of probability strategies and modifies the retailers' rational cognition. Moreover,we resolves the format of quantity discount by theoretical method and finds that the forms should be changed according to different degrees of rationality. Then the experiment proves the effectiveness of quantity discount mechanism and the results show that the experiment data are consistant with the quantal response equilibrium model. In addition,the experiment gives the real value of the parameters in the model,evaluating that rational index of retailer is about 1.31,under which channel coordination mechanism is different from standard economic theory. Thus this study provides theoretical and emprnical basis for constructing of channel coordination mechanism more reasonably.
出处 《管理科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2010年第2期45-51,共7页 Journal of Management Science
基金 国家自然科学基金(70672071)~~
关键词 渠道协调 数量折扣 最优反应均衡 STACKELBERG博弈 chanel coordination quantity discount quantal response equilibrium Stackelberg game
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参考文献23

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