摘要
随着全球性的气候变化危机日益严重,国际碳交易成为抑制全球气候变暖的有效途径,它是利用市场机制引领低碳经济发展的必由之路。虽然国际碳交易市场蕴藏着巨大的经济利益,但是国际碳交易机制还没有完善。完美的国际碳交易机制应该是一种显示偏好博弈的过程,只有在国际碳市场中,每个博弈参与者都真实的反应自己的信息与偏好,最后的显示偏好博弈纳什均衡结果才能是帕累托有效、公平的。在国际节能减排事业中,我国应该积极的参与到国际碳交易的显示偏好博弈中,促使国际碳交易市场做到有效、公平、抗操纵且满足于个体理性,为完善国际碳交易机制做出更大的贡献。
With the increasing risk happening to the environmental resources of the global system and more and more serious problems of global warming, international carbon emissions trading will he an effective way to inhibit global wanning. Although international carbon emissions market will bring us big profits in future, the mechanism has not been established perfectly. The mechanism of international cation emissions trading should be a process of revealing preference game, only all the players show their information and preferences truly, can the equilibrium outcome be unique and Pareto efficient. China should participate in the international carbom emissions trading more actively, pnxnting the efficiency, justice and rationality in the emissions market, and play a more important role in the international earn ;pareto trading.
出处
《工业技术经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第6期87-93,共7页
Journal of Industrial Technological Economics
基金
国家社科基金重点项目"不可再生资源跨期优化配置机制研究"(项目编号:11AZD100)
关键词
国际碳交易
显示偏好博弈
帕累托最优
intermational carbon emissions trading
revealing preference game
pareto optimality
