摘要
农村防灾减灾能力建设的政府资金投入体系中中央政府和不同的地方政府之间的博弈可以看作是中央政府和地方政府、地方政府和地方政府之间的两个层次的进化博弈.通过建立三方进化博弈模型来分析博弈达到均衡的过程,试图建立农村防灾减灾能力建设中政府资金投入的激励机制.根据分析结果可以得出两点启示:应将农村防灾减灾能力的强弱纳入地方政府政绩考核评价体系当中;地方政府进行农村防灾减灾能力建设的资金利用效率会影响到博弈的最终均衡.
The game between central government and the different local governments in the government funding system of rural disaster prevention and mitigation capacity construction can be regarded as an evolutionary game of 2 layers between the central government and local government, local government and local government. Based on evolutionary game model the article establish an tripartite evolutionary game and analyze the process to balance the game trying to establish an incentive mechanism of government founds in the construction of rural disaster prevention and mitigation capacity, according to the results of analysis can draw two revelation： the ability of rural disaster prevention and mitigation should be brought into the local government performance evaluation system; the funds utilization efficiency in the construction of rural disaster prevention and mitigation capacity of local government will affect the final game balance.
出处
《数学的实践与认识》
CSCD
北大核心
2010年第7期90-95,共6页
Mathematics in Practice and Theory
基金
山西省高等学校哲学社会科学研究项目(20092021)
