期刊文献+

委托代理理论范式下企业经营者与企业员工博弈的最优均衡

The Principal-agent Paradigm-Based Optimal Equilibrium in the Game of Proprietors and Employees
在线阅读 下载PDF
导出
摘要 分析了业经营者与企业员工之间的委托代理关系和博弈关系特征,讨论了二者在企业生产经营过程中的利益博弈可能出现纳什均衡的多种情况,认为员工在效用函数上的差异是导致多重纳什均衡出现的原因并对最优均衡的选择具有决定性影响,经营者针对这些情况设计的员工激励机制应有足够的适应性;本文的另一个分析结论是,如果博弈中的员工具有基本一致的效用函数,员工激励机制的设计就应努力寻求激励成本最低的物质激励与精神激励的组合激励方案。 This paper analyzes the feature of principal-agent relationship and game relationship between the proprietors and the employees, discusses the various circumstances of Nash Equilibrium that is possible to show in their interest game of business activities, thinks the reason that induces Multi- Nash Equilibrium is the employees' different utility function, which has the decisive influence on the selection of optimal equilibrium. Based on these circumstances, the incentive mechanism designed by the enterprise managers should has adequate adaptation; Another conclusion of this paper is, if the employees have the similar utility function in the game, great efforts should be made to seek the combination of material incentive and the spiritual incentive whose cost is the lowest on the design of employees' incentive mechanism
出处 《河南理工大学学报(社会科学版)》 2009年第3期504-508,共5页 Journal of Henan Polytechnic University:Social Sciences
关键词 激励机制 企业员工 博弈 纳什均衡 incentive mechanism employees game Nash equilibrium
  • 相关文献

参考文献9

二级参考文献10

共引文献56

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部